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Market mechanisms have been paii of the climate regime for decades. Yet, the politics 
and economics of climate change have changed dramatically since those flexibility 
mechanisms were made part of the Kyoto Protocol. This ai·ticle examines the role of 
trading mechanisms in the climate regime, and in particular how changing dynainics 
and treaty structures have affected negotiations around the mechanisms ' rules. 
Rules on the operation of market mechanisms were initially codified in the 2001 
Marrakesh Accords, 1 which established the modalities, rules, and guidelines for 
emission trading under the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol reflected what was then 
considered to be a traditional enviromnental treaty, with set emission-reduction targets, 
binding only on developed countries, monitored through a robust compliance 
mechanism to ensure that developed countries were faithful to their commitments. At 
the time, emission-trading mechanisms were a controversial innovation at the global 
level, and not all states were initially supp01i ive of their inclusion.2 Developing 
countries expected financial benefits to flow equitably from the projects of the Clean 
Development Mechanism to assist them with technology transfer and adaptation 
financing. The Kyoto Protocol world ended up being very different in practice. As is 
well known, the United States never ratified the treaty, many developing countries were 
disappointed by the operation of the CDM, Canada withdrew before the first 
commitment period ended, and the second commitment period set out in the Doha 
Amendment failed to engage much of a constituency beyond the European Union. 
By the time the second commitment period came to an end at the end of 2020, the 
Kyoto regime was already more of a memory than an operative force, having been 
supplanted in policy discourse by a forward-looking perspective focused on the Paris 
Agreement. This Agreement was largely a reaction away from the perceived 
inadequacies of the prior regime. For instance, while the Enforcement Branch of the 
Compliance Committee continued to be active under the Kyoto Protocol, UNFCCC 
parties declined to incorporate that compliance model, consisting of a facilitative and 
enforcement branch, into the Paris Agreement. 
Although the Paris Agreement permits the use of market mechanisms for mitigation 
purposes, the treaty represents a very different landscape from the Protocol, with 
binding, lai·gely procedural, obligations of conduct and performance, but non-binding 
and differentiated emission-reduction trajectories for developed and developing 
countries, alongside a facilitative, advisory and non-punitive compliance mechanism. 
Nationally Determined Contributions are self-d ifferentiated. Despite these structural 
differences, the shadow of the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakesh Accords still hovers 
over the Article 6 negotiations, as we will explain. 
1 The Marrakesh Accords are a group of draft decisions negotiated under the COP between 1997 and 
2001 , and adopted by CMP.1 held in Montreal in 2005: Kyoto Protocol, Report of the Conference of the 
Parties sen1ing as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its first session, held at Montreal 
from 28 November to 10 December 2005, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add. 1 (2006). 
2 The Kyoto Protocol ' s flexibility mechanisms were included largely at the insistence of the United 
States; see Joarum Depledge, Tracing the Origins of the Kyoto Protocol: An Article-by-Article Textual 































































In this article we explore the similarities and differences in regulatory design between 
the Paris Rulebook and the MaiTakesh Accords and their implications for sustainability 
and climate integrity. Specifically, the aii icle examines the role of trading mechanisms 
in the climate regime, providing a historical perspective on the negotiations and content 
of the MatTakesh Accords to infom1 an evaluation of the current status of the A1iicle 6 
Rulebook negotiations. The analysis asks whether the changing dynamics and structure 
of the Pai·is Agreement adequately explain the roadblocks encountered during the 
A1iicle 6 negotiations; ai1d it offers lessons leained from the Marrakesh process to help 
parties navigate the Article 6 negotiations. 
We begin by briefly reviewing market mechanisms in the UN climate regime, laying a 
foundation for the subsequent analysis. We then compare the MaiTakesh Accords and 
the Paiis Rulebook, with an eye to their relationship. We examine the dynamics of the 
negotiations on the draft text to implement Article 6 of the Pai·is Agreement, inforn1ed 
by prior experience with the Marrakesh Accords, in an attempt to explain the 
impediments that have plagued this remaining piece of the Rulebook puzzle. Last, the 
analysis assesses the two instruments-the Marrakesh Accords and the Paris Rulebook 
A1iicle 6 draft texts- as illuminating the strengths and weaknesses of the two self-
consciously divergent approaches. 
2. Market Mechanisms and the UN Climate Regime 
Market-based mechanisms have been around for a long time, and were initiated 
originally by non-state actors such as BP and Shell. 3 They ai·e designed to lead to 
greater efficiency in environmental and energy policies by reducing the costs of 
implementing and complying with environmental measures, and so incentivizing 
technological change.4 An effective international emission-trading system relies on 
ambitious and binding emission targets to ensure that the penn its are scarce, and 
therefore that the trading of pen11its will generate revenue ai1d incentivize emission 
reductions. 5 It also requires accurate reporting and a well-designed compliance 
mechanism to monitor, track, and verify emission reductions and transfers, and to 
compel state compliance with the regime. 6 
Trading was included in Atiicle 17 of the Kyoto Protocol as one of the flexibility 
mechanisms to help Atmex I pai·ties to meet their emission-reduction targets. The 
Protocol's trading mechanism was the inspiration for the EU ETS- now one of the 
most mature and integrated emission-trading systems in the world. 
The agreement of rules around A1i icle 6 of the Paris Agreement will be critical to the 
success of a global emission-trading system. The level of ambition integrated into the 
3 David G. Victor and Joshua C. House, 'BP ' s Emission Trading System', 34(1 5) Energy Policy 2100 
(2006), 21 03. 
4 David Pearce, 'The Political Economy of an Energy Tax: The United Kingdom's Climate Change 
Levy', 28(2) Energy Economics 149 (2006), 149. 
5 Lisa Benjamin, Companies and Climate Change: Theory and Lcn11 in the United Kingdom (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 132. 
6 Farhana Yamin and Joan11a Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, 































































design of the rules around Article 6 could make or break the achievement of the global 
warming limitation goals, and therefore the success of the Paris Agreement itself. 7 
Issues of ambition and governance are at stake in the Article 6 negotiations. If not well-
designed, the Article 6 rules could undermine the ambition of parties ' NDCs. 
As a direct descendent of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol reflects a strict binary 
approach to states.8 The FCCC's post-Cold War context of profound divisions 
between superpowers and post-colonial states9 led to the Am1ex I/non-Annex I division 
in the treaty. Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC stipulates that Annex I parties will take the 
lead in emission reductions, and the Berlin Mandate (the political agreement that served 
as a mandate for negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol) made it clear that no new 
commitments would be imposed on non-Annex I pariies. 10 
The Kyoto Protocol mechanism established patterns and expectations that may or may 
not be reflected in the Ati icle 6 mechanisms. These include that emission trading is 
designed to be supplemental to parties ' domestic emission cuts. In hindsight, the Kyoto 
Protocol made very limited demands on Annex I par·ties to reduce emissions. 11 They 
were given significant flexibility to deternline their desired emission reductions. They 
agreed to make, on average, a 5 per cent reduction below 1990 levels over the first 
commitment period (2008-2012). Compared to the net-zero and other national targets 
being contemplated less than a decade later in NDCs, the original Protocol targets 
appear conservative, at best, in their lack of an1bition, notwithstanding that some 
countries struggled to achieve them. Annex I par·ties 'agreed ' their tar·gets under the 
Protocol by proposing their own commitments. They were submitted and negotiated in 
a process similar to the 'bottom up ' structure of the Paris Agreement, with parties 'self-
differentiating' based on their national circumstances. The Kyoto Protocol, moreover, 
was a first cut, or a 'shot across the bow', in addressing the global challenge of climate 
integrity, designed in part as a conceptual model for future, more ambitious, 
undertakings, including ones that could be extended to non-Annex I par·ties. 
Because the design and eventual implementation of the Kyoto Protocol is instructive for 
the Article 6 negotiations, the next section focuses on the process, drafting, roadblocks, 
and outcomes of the Marrakesh process, as well as on the Article 6 negotiations. 
7 Noah Sachs notes the Paris Agreement's already fragile architech1re: 'The Paris Agreement in tl1e 
2020s: Breakdown or Breakup?' , 46(3) Ecology Law Quarter~y 865 (2019), 872 (' The non binding nahlre 
of NDCs has several consequences that make the Paris Agreement fragile and prone to defections ') . 
8 Th.is all-or-nothing strnch1re, going back to the 1992 UNFCCC, is something of an 'original sin ' that 
continues to hobble the UN climate negotiations even now. Article 3(1 ) of the UNFCCC itself articulates 
the need for 'common but differentiated responsibilities ' (emphasis supplied). A comparison to the 
ontreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, which gave low-consuming parties an 
extended compliance period but engaged all parties in the common enterprise of protecting the 
stratospheric ozone layer, is informative; see David A Wi.t1h and Daniel A Lashof, 'Beyond Viem1a and 
ontreal: Multilateral Agreements on Greenhouse Gases', 19( 6/7) Ambia 305 (I 990). 
9 aria Jernnas and Bjorn-Ola Linner, 'A Discursive Caiiography of ationally Determi.t1ed 
Contributions to tl1e Paris Climate Agreement ', 55 Global Environmental Change 73 (20 19). 
10 UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP. 1, The Berlin Mandate: Review of the adequacy of Article 4, paragraph 2(a) 
and (b), of the Convention, including proposals related to a protocol and decisions onfo11o11'-up, 
FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (1995), para. 2(a)-(b) . 
11 Bradley C. Pai·ks and J. Timmons Robe11s, 'Climate Change, Social The01y and Justice' , 27(2) Theo,y, 































































3. Implementing the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement 
Despite the complexity and length of negotiations leading to the final treaty, both the 
Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement were understood at the time of their adoption 
to represent the skeletal outlines of regimes that required further elaboration. 
Consequently, work on what became the Man-akesh Accords and the Paris Rulebook 
began almost immediately; indeed, it was anticipated in the mandates accompanying 
both treaties' adoption. In both cases, it was anticipated that the elaboration mechanisms 
would be COP decisions, which would be at least in a formal sense non-binding. The 
subsequent trajectories for each of these instruments further amplifies and elucidates the 
divergences in regulatory design between the Protocol and the Paris Agreement. 12 
3.1. The Marrakesh Accords 
Given the Kyoto Protocol's complex structure, the establishment of a multilaterally 
standardized accounting system was essential to its implementation. Indeed, accounting 
for emissions in a manner not too dissimilar to the financial equivalent can be viewed as 
the central challenge of the Protocol 's implementation. 13 But unlike cmTencies, whose 
content is fixed, knowable, countable, and consequently tradable, standards for 
measuring and accounting for greenhouse gas emissions had to be established from 
scratch. 
It is all too easy to forget the tenuous situation of the Kyoto Protocol at that early stage. 
COP 6 had concluded in November 2000 with a lengthy, heavily bracketed text 
reflecting considerable remaining disagreement on the major issues relating to the rules 
for implementing the Kyoto Protocol. 14 In March 2001 the United States announced its 
decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, threatening not only US participation in the 
Kyoto regime but also the Protocol's entry into force. 
Nowhere was the challenge in negotiating the implementation of the Protocol more 
apparent than in the trading mechanisms: Articles 6 (Joint Implementation), 12 (CDM), 
and 17 (trading of Assigned Amount Units).15 The negotiation of the MaiTakesh 
Accords revealed the multiple junctures at which the cogs in the Kyoto machine could 
encounter fiiction, or potentially seize up altogether. 16 So, for example, emissions 
12 David A. Wirth, 'The Paris Agreement as a ew Component of the Climate Regime ', 12(4) 
International Organisations Research Journal 185 (20 17). 
13 Daniel Bodansky, 'Bonn Voyage: Kyoto 's Unce1tain Revival', The National Interest, l September 
2001 , 44-5. 
14 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on the First Part of its Sixth Session, Held at the 
Hague from 13 to 25 November 2000, FCCC/CP/2000/5/Add.3 (vol. V) (2001). 
15 See, generally, Matthew Vespa, 'Climate Change 2001: Kyoto at Bonn and Manakech ', 29 (2) Ecology 
Law Quarterly 395 (2002). 
16 On the negotiations of the Marrakesh Accords, see David A. Wirth, 'The Sixth Session (Part Two) and 
Seventh Session of the Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change', 
96(3) American Journal of International LcM 648 (2002); Karsten owrnt, 'Saving the International 
Legal Regime on Climate Change: The 2001 Conferences ofBonn and Mairnkesh', 44 German Yearbook 
of International Law 396 (2001); and Emily Boyd and Emma Lisa Schipper, 'The Manakech Accord-
At the Crossroad to Ratification: Seventh Conference of the Pa11ies to the United ations Framework 































































across the six gases had to be scaled for comparability through reduction to a common 
metric of CO2 equivalents- a relatively non-controversial task, relying on global 
warming potentials established by the IPCC. 
At a greater level of complexity, reliable emission data were required, including for the 
base year of 1990 ( against which further obligatory national reductions would be 
measured) and for determining the entry into force of the Protocol (by reference to an 
aggregate amount of 1990 emissions of ratifying parties). Emission data had to be 
gathered from widely disparate sectors, such as power plants, manufacturing facilities, 
and motor vehicles. An immense virtual ledger needed to be imagined, in which 
baselines, emissions, emission reductions, and trades could be inscribed and audited. 
By contrast with the relative availability and reliability of data from the industrial 
sectors, the burning of forest, whether purposeful or accidental, was perceived as 
emblematic of the obstacles presented by the land use, land-use change, and forestry 
sector. Similarly, emissions from ag1iculture, such as from rice cultivation, but also 
from soils themselves, seemed to be invitations to uncertainty, and consequently to 
potential abuse, whether intentionally or through technical limitations. Credits for sinks, 
such as afforestation effo1is, were particularly controversial. Comparability needed to 
be established across all three of the flexibility mechanisms to assure tradability in 
emission allowances. 
The CDM by its very structure created leakage from the closed system of Annex I 
parties with emission-reduction obligations. The requirement of ' additionality' loomed 
large as a potential weak link in the system, a concern that has proved to be prescient as 
we shall see below. There was great concern for the vigor of compliance procedures17 as 
linked to the integrity of the reporting and accounting essential to the Kyoto Protocol's 
functioning. 18 Some concerns drifted toward the philosophical, as in the discussion over 
whether access to the mechanisms ought to be unburdened and be broadly accessible, or 
limited to an ancillary tool to ensure compliance at the margins. 
The final ' crunch ' issues and their resolution give an insight into questions that the 
negotiators considered of the highest priority in the Marrakesh Accords. For instance, 
nuclear power installations in the end were excluded from the JI scheme 19 and the 
CDM.20 The ' commitment period reserve'- a constraint on ' supplementarity' designed 
to discourage over-reliance on trading to meet reduction targets- was set at 90 per cent 
of a paiiy' s 1990 baseline emissions, or 100 per cent of the level of the most recent 
17 Rene Lefeber, 'From the Hague to Bonn to Marrakesh and Beyond: A Negotiating History of the 
Compliance Regime under the Kyoto Protocol', 14 Hague Yearbook of International Law 25 (2001). 
18 See, generally, Olav Schram Stokke, Jon Hovi, and Geir Ulfstein, Implementing the Climate Regime: 
International Compliance (London: Earthscan, 2005). 
19 UNFCCC, Decision 16/CP.7, Guidelines for the implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, 
FCCC/CP/CMP/2001/13/Add.2 (2002), Preamble, para. 4 : ' Parties included in Annex I are to refrain 
from using emission reduction units generated from nuclear facilities to meet their commitments under 
At1icle 3, paragraph 1 [ of the Protocol]'. 
20 UNFCCC, Decision 17 /CP. 7, Modalities and procedures for a clean development 111echanis111 as 
defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, FCCC/CP/CMP/200 1/13/Add.2 (2002), Preamble, para. 5: 
'Parties included in Annex I are to refrain from using ce11ified emission reductions generated from 































































emission inventory, whichever is lower. This provision was a proxy for concern about 
the treatment of 'hot air' from states such as those of the fon11er USSR, which during 
the perestroika period experienced aiiificially premature reductions that would be 
available for sale as credits. 
Sinks generated a number of compromises. They are controversial as to their definition 
and chai·acter. For example, they may be counted against a pa1ty 's emission-reduction 
target provided that the activities are ' human-induced' and have occuned since 1990. 
But sinks are mutable. For example, agricultural and forestry practices can change 
considerably, therefore changing their sequestration properties. States agreed that 
agricultural practices could produce emission credits only to the extent that the net 
effect is to sequester more carbon. Forest management (e.g. conservation of existing 
forests) was made subject to a global limitation of about 83 Mt of carbon per yeai·, 
apportioned by fornmla among Annex B countries (excluding the United States).21 
In the CDM, a compromise confined LULUCF projects eligible for credits during the 
first commitment period to afforestation and reforestation. It limited net credits earned 
for these activities to no more than 1 per cent of a patty's base-yeai· emissions.22 The 
parties delegated the responsibility to elaborate further accounting methodologies for 
this category to the SBST A. At the Manak:esh meeting, the Russian Federation, having 
noted the absolute necessity of its ratification for the Protocol' s entry into force 
following the US announcement of non-ratification, successfully negotiated an increase 
in its ceiling for forest-management credits. This exception allowed it to roughly double 
what the earlier negotiations had allocated it,23 illustrating the many loopholes, 
exceptions, and complexity contained in the Manakesh negotiations, which would later 
also plague the A1iicle 6 negotiations. 
The use of tradable permits in the Kyoto Protocol was introduced to moderate the 
rigidity of the targets, but pen11it allocations within the domestic jurisdictions were 
often made at no cost, in order to 'buy acceptance' of industry of the new cap-and-trade 
regime.24 The ' grandfathering in ' of existing pollution levels through the free allocation 
of permits effectively froze the status quo of emissions during the first commitment 
period. The low level of ambition in the international carbon market led to an 
oversupply of international carbon credits, which, combined with economic and 
political developments in economies in transition, and flexibilities requested by some 
EITs, kept the price of carbon at very low levels. 25 The Kyoto Protocol facilitated the 
inclusion of hot air by allowing parties, particularly EITs, to overestimate their 
21 Kyoto Protocol, Decision 16/CMP .1 , Land use, land use change and foreshy, 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (2006), Annex, para. 11. 
22 Ibid. , para. 14. 
23 Ibid. , para. 11 and Appendix note c: 'This figure [ containing the allocation to the Russian Federation] is 
changed from 17.63 [in the earlier Bonn Accords which concluded COP 6bis] to 33.00 by decision 
12/CP. 7 [ i.e. the fmal Marrakesh Accords]'. 
24 Judith Rees, 'Markets: The Panacea for Environmental Regulation?' , 23(3) Geofont111 383 (1 992), 391. 
The US proposal for the Berlin Mandate and the Kyoto Protocol was modeled on its domestic system of 
tradeable emissions rights for sulfur dioxide. 
25 Sampo Seppanen, et al. , Demand in a Fragmented Global Carbon Market: Outlook and Policy 
































































emissions way above business as usual.26 These gaps and oversights were a 
combination of design flaws, as well as unanticipated economic developments-
unfortunately, many of the same issues plague the Article 6 negotiations. 
Despite the design weaknesses, all the matters negotiated during the MaiTakesh Accords 
boil down to rules that, but for the items being counted, would be reasonably familiai· to 
a tax accountai1t; which sheds a great deal of light on the negotiators ' view of the final 
product. Whether motivated by issues of principle or national interest, the portions of 
the MatTakesh Accords dealing with the trading mechanisms are all framed in the form 
of, literally, operative instructions as to how to count. It was crystal clear to everyone 
participating in the negotiations what a great effort was involved in articulating those 
rules-more than 200 pages of them, every comma agreed by consensus-with the 
greatest precision and specificity possible.27 
3.2. The Paris Rulebook 
The structure of the Paris Agreement reflects very different emission levels and political 
economies around climate change than existed in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
worlds. The G77 and China is a more diversified and stratified group than it was during 
the Protocol negotiations, and global climate governance has become increasingly 
hybridized since the Protocol.28 The negotiation roadmap in the lead-up to the Paris 
Agreement reflects this changing world. The Durban Mandate provided states with 
various options, including a variety of legal forms, that the new agreement could take. 29 
The United States was one of the main drivers of this hybrid approach, jettisoning a 
binding legal protocol, a third commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, or an ai11endment 
to the UNFCCC, in favour of an approach that would be more palatable to it. 30 
The United States made it clear that a bottom-up approach could include a mixture of 
both legally binding commitments and non-binding statements within one legal text. 31 
The US-China Joint Agreement in ovember of 2014 was critical in articulating an 
amended principle of differentiation, being common but differentiated responsibility 
and respective capacity with the addition of evolving national circmnstances. 32 This 
added a level of dynainism to what had otherwise become a strict and stultified 
principle under the Kyoto Protocol, evidenced through its Annexes. The modified 
26 Toon Vandyck, et al. , ' A Global Stocktake of the Paris Pledges: Implications for Energy Systems and 
Economy', 41 Global Environmental Change 46 (2016), 47. 
27 Suraje Dessai and Emma Lisa Schipper, 'The Ma1Takech Accords to the Kyoto Protocol: Analysis and 
Future Prospects', 13(2) Global Environmental Change 149 (2003) . 
28 Jernnas and Linner, supra note 9, at 581. 
29 The outcome of the negotiations launched at Durban could take the form of 'a protocol, another legal 
instrument or an agreement outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all parties': 
UNFCCC, Decision l /CP.1 7, Estab1i.sh111ent of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban action Platform 
for Enhanced Action, FCCC/CP/201 1/9/Add. 1 (2012), para. 2. 
30 David A Wirth, 'Cracking the American Climate Negotiators' Hidden Code: United States Law and 
the Paris Agreement' , 6( 1/2) Climate Lcn 11 152 (20 I 6), 155. 
31 Ibid. , 156. 
32 US-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change, 25 September 20 15, Office of the Press 
Secretary of the White House, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/us-































































principle lent a context-specific quality to differentiation which was subsequently 
folded into each element of the Paris Agreement, as paiiies felt appropriate. 33 
The Paris Agreement reflects the hybridizing developments in its flexib le provisions. 34 
There are nuanced levels of differentiation which shift ai1d change between each aiiicle 
of the Agreement. Its main characteristics are the non-binding, 35 bottom-up DCs, 
which are combined with stricter, top-down procedural rules which introduce discipline 
into the process of submission ofNDCs. 36 The provisions strike a balance between a 
bifurcated approach with reference to the UNFCCC and a spectrum of differentiated 
commitments with reference to provisions that are applicable to all. 37 
This nuanced approach applies to mitigation commitments as well. They are bifurcated 
in that developed countties-by and large the Annex I parties to the Kyoto Protocol-
must produce NDCs that are, in analogy with the Protocol, absolute and economy-wide; 
and developing countlies agree to enhance their mitigation commitments and work 
toward NDCs that are economy-wide. 38 These obligations all use 'should ' language-a 
weaker form of obligation which contrasts with the stl"onger 'shall ' language found in 
other places in the Agreement. Guidance and methodologies exist for the reporting 
requirements of absolute, economy-wide NDCs, bon-owing from the experience of 
Annex I paiiies reporting under the Kyoto Protocol; but even here, developed countries 
can choose between single-year or multi-year targets (i. e. targets that apply to the final 
year or targets that cover a period of yeai·s). For example, in the second round ofNDCs, 
submitted by the parties in December 2020, most developed countries have opted for 
economy-wide single-year targets to 2030 (with a few opting for 2025 or 2050). 39 For 
developing countries, it is unclear which methodologies will be adopted for the vast 
diversity of content of their NDCs, as the Paris Rulebook does not provide much 
guidance in this respect.4° For example, some developing countries have submitted 
strategies, plans, and actions as components of their NDCs with no quantifiable 
infonnation.41 Differentiation thus applies to both the content of the contribution and 
the form of the commitment in terms of what the targets will look like. 42 
33 Christina Voigt and Felipe Fe1Teira, 'Differentiation in the Paris Agreement ', 6(1/2) Climate Lcnv 58 
(2016), 63. 
34 Daniel Bodansky, 'Reflections on tl1e Paris Conference ', Opinio Juris, 15 December 2015, 
<http://opiniojuris.org/20 15/ 12/ 15/reflections-on-the-paris-conference/>. 
35 On one view, the United States could have agreed binding emission targets even in executive 
agreement, without Senate advice and consent to ratification: David A. Wi11h, 'The International and 
Domestic Law of Climate Change: A Binding International Agreement Without the Senate or Congress?' , 
39(2) Harvard Environmental Lcnv Review 515 (2015). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Voigt and Fe1Teira, supra note 33, at 63; Lavanya Rajamani and Jutta Brunnee, 'The Legality of 
Downgrading Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement: Lessons from the US 
Disengagement', 29(3) Journal of Environmental Law 537 (2017). 
38 Paris Agreement, Article 4(4). 
39 UNFCCC Secretariat, National~y Determined Contributions Under the Paris Agreement, 
FCCCIP A/CMA/2021/2 (202 1 ). 
40 Meinhard Doelle, 'The Heart of the Paris Rulebook: Communicating DCs and Accounting for Their 
Implementation', 9(1/2) Climate Law 3 (2019) 13. 
41 UNFCCC Secretariat, supra note 39. 































































NDCs are universal; they provide significant flexibility to countries to tailor their 
ambitions to their national priorities; and they must go through five-yearly cycles of 
review to progressively upgrade ambition. 43 Besides these commonalities, there is a 
huge diversity in what NDCs cover in tem1s of targeted contributions, sectors, and 
activities. Many DCs submitted by developing countries are conditional on receiving 
finance, technology transfer, or capacity building. 44 The vast diversity of mitigation 
contributions is a direct consequence of the country-driven process of developing NDCs 
which was critical to the successful adoption of the Paris Agreement. 45 It also reflects 
the rnshed nature of the development of the first round ofNDCs, which were submitted 
on ratification of the Paris Agreement, and which largely reflected countries ' DCs. 46 
In upgrading their NDCs, developing countries, in particular, will need to build 
expertise, gather data, align NDCs with existing national policies, and gain support for 
mitigation contributions from public and private actors .47 
4. Learning from Marrakesh iu the Rulebook Negotiations 
Much of the public debate over the A1iicle 6 portion of the Pa1is Rulebook has an ee1ily 
familiar ring to veterans of the Marrakesh Accord negotiations. Avoiding double-
counting, assming the integrity of the system and of individual trades under its auspices 
by reference to a sustainability metric, and the like, are all familiar themes. But the 
Rulebook is emerging within the framework of a very different regime, one that 
requires all parties to contribute mitigation measures, with multiple base years and 
metrics, some of which may not be quantifiable. The transition from the Kyoto Protocol 
regime, pa1iicularly the CDM's transition, is an additional challenge that did not face 
the negotiators of the Marrakesh Accords. 
4.1. Political and Economic Obstacles in the Article 6 Negotiations 
Article 6 establishes two main types of emission-trading mechanisms, based on 
voluntary cooperation. The first is found under Article 6(2)-(3) and is a market-based 
mechanism. It allows internationally traded mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) to be 
generated by one com1try and transferred to another to count towards the latter's NDC 
contribution. Paris Agreement parties can do this by linking their emission-trading 
systems, concluding a joint banking/credit approach, or by other forms of cooperation.48 
43 Paris Agreement, Article 4(3) and 4(9). 
44 W. P. Pauw, et al. , 'Conditional ationally Determined Contributions in the Paris Agreement: Foothold 
for Equity or Achilles heel? ' , 20(4) Climate Policy 468 (2020) 469 (' Of the 186 NDCs submitted to the 
UNFCCC at the time of writing, 136 are conditional on one or more kinds of support '). 
45 Frauke Roser, et al. , 'Ambition in the Making: Analysing the Preparation and Implementation Process 
of the Nationally Dete1mined ContJibutions in the Paris Agreement' , 20(4) Climate Policy 415 (2020), 
416. 
46 Doelle, supra note 40, 15. 
47 Roser, et al. , supra note 45, 416. 
48 Matthieu Wemaere, 'Aliicle 6 Voluntary Cooperation/NDCs ', in The Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change: A Commentary, edited by Geert Van Calster and Leonie Reins (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 































































This mechanism establishes a decentralized process, which was designed by states to 
provide flexibility to market participants.49 However, the safeguards and limitations that 
some parties are suggesting to include in the Article 6 guidance would require a more 
centralized governance approach. 50 Atiicle 6.2 uses a prescriptive 'shall '- that the 
mechanism shall promote sustainable development, environmental integ1i ty, and 
transparency- and so some parties are insisting on envirom11ental and sustainable 
development safeguards. 51 Conversely, many parties see the concept of sustainable 
development as nationally d1iven, and so resist a strict assessment of whether an ITMO 
cont1i butes to sustainable development. 52 Some count1ies such as India and Saudi 
Arabia, are insisting on flexibility around the metrics of what counts in an ITMO, and 
on the ability of countties to rely on non-greenhouse-gas metrics, such as kilowatts of 
elect1icity produced. 53 Other countries have pushed back and requested a 'buffer 
registry' to convert these non-greenhouse-gas metrics into gas-based metrics, which 
would require a more centralized registry system. 54 
The second mechanism is found under Article 6( 4)-6(7) and is refe1Ted to as the 
sustainable development mechanism. It is similar to the CDM, and designed as an 
apparent successor to it, except that all countries (not just developing ones) can host an 
activity. 55 Activities are defined broadly and can include projects, programmes, or 
policies. 56 The mechanism, which anticipates a more centralized process via a 
Supervising Body, is supposed to contribute to an overall mitigation in global emissions 
(OMGE), that is, not mere offsets between country A and country B. OMGE is only 
mentioned in Article 6(4), although there is a strong push to have it apply to the first 
mechanism, as well, by setting aside or cancelling a fixed mm1ber of credits to benefit 
the world 's atmospheric concentration as a whole. 57 
The CDM has been a flash point both in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol 
under the Ma1Takesh Accords and in the Article 6 Rulebook negotiations. It is well 
known that the CDM has been subject to near-universal criticism,58 not least because of 
49 Asian Development Bank, Decoding Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. Version JI. December 2020 
(ADB, 2020), 6, <,vww .adb. org/sites/default/files/publication/664051/article6-paris-agreement-v2.pdf>. 
50 Ibid. 
51 These parties include members of the AOSIS and the European Union. Strictly as a matter of public 
international law, this phraseology, self-evidently intended to amplify the vigor of the operative language, 
does not alter the non-binding character of the principles set out in the Rulebook. That is, notwithstanding 
the use of 'shall', the Ru lebook, like the Marrakesh Accords, is non-binding. 
52 Asian Development Bank, supra note 49, 15. 
53 Ibid. , 21. 
54 Draft text on Matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: Guidance on cooperative 
approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, version 3 of 15 December 
00:50 hrs, Doc. DT.CMA2.il la.v3 , Annex, para. III .B.10. 
55 See Drcifl Text on Matters Relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: Guidance on cooperative 
approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement, version 3 of 15 December 1: 10 
hrs, Doc. DT.CMA2.il 1 b.v3 , para. 7(g), proposing transition of activities from the CDM to the Article 
6(4) mechanism. 
56 Wemaere, supra note 48 , para 6.37. 
57 Simon Evans and Josh Gabbatiss, 'COP25: Key Outcomes Agreed at the UN Climate Talks in Madrid ', 
Carbon Brief, 15 December 2019, <www.carbonbrief.org/cop25 -key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-
talks-in-madrid>. 
58 For instance, US Government Accountability Office, Climate Change Issues: Options for Addressing 































































the difficulty in applying the but-for test of additionality and the mechanism's 
concentration of projects in the industrial sector and in China. 59 The Kyoto Protocol 
parties could have learnt more from the CDM's mistakes, or rather implemented fixes 
for the mistakes and loopholes they became aware of. A meaningful response requires 
allowing independent, neutral technical experts-appointed in their private capacities 
and fully insulated from pressures from stakeholders- to develop methodologies that 
achieve global mitigation outcomes. These and other technical issues could have been 
addressed, but the opportunity was missed. 60 
In the Article 6 negotiations, some states, such as India, China, and Brazil , are 
advocating for credits earned under the Kyoto Protocol to be transfen-ed to the Article 6 
mechanisms, effectively introducing hot air again into the trading system. They argue 
that these credits have been accepted in the FCCC system and are therefore durable 
and transferable. Vulnerable countries, such as members of AOSIS, are critical of 
attempts to introduce hot air. 61 States introduced progression over time into the ratchet 
mechanism ofNDCs as a forward-looking principle, encapsulating the approach of 'no 
backsliding'. 62 The introduction of hot air would appear to contravene this principle. 
Many market participants, such as oil-and-gas companies, are watching the negotiations 
around the rules of Article 6 closely, of course, and supp01i flexible, market-based 
approaches, through groups such as the International Emissions Trading Association. 
Undervalued credits would make it much cheaper for polluters to buy offsets. 63 This 
would replicate the mistakes of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Underpinning these negotiation controversies is a debate about what an NDC actually 
is. The traditional interpretation, endorsed by the overwhelming majority of pa1iies, is 
that an NDC is what has been pledged by a party. 64 But some parties interpret an DC 
as the sum of actions a party takes in order to meet the pledge in the NDC, and so 
activities undertaken outside of those articulated in an NDC could be eligible for an 
ITMO.65 This would apply to countries that list strategies and actions, as opposed to 
quantified targets, in their NDC. The approach is favoured by countries such as Brazil, 
Saudi Arabia, and India, which seek much more flexibility in the rules around Article 6, 
including pennission for activities that fall outside their NDC to be eligible under the 
' Is the Clean Development Mechanism Sustainable? Some Critical Aspects', 18(2) Sustainable 
Development Law and Policy 15 (2008), 18 ('The reality of CDM projects has so far been quite different 
from their initial conception ... almost all proposed and approved projects to date have primarily focused 
on maximizing the generation of CERs instead of focusing on sustainable development'). 
59 See Brnce Rich, 'An International Regime in Crisis' , Environmental Forum, May/June 20 11, 20: 
(criticizing HFC substitution projects in China, and concluding that 'The The Kyoto Protocol 's Clean 
Development Mechanism is fundamentally flawed'). 
60 In a development that some might regard as troubling in light of unfinished business in red irecting the 
CDM, the ICAO Council in March 2020 identified the CDM as one of six approved offset schemes 
qualifying under its Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA). 
61 Evans and Gabbatiss, supra note 57. 
62 Rajamani and Brnnnee, supra note 37, 545. 
63 Abhilasha Fullonton, 'India's position on Aliicle 6 at COP 25 Explained ', Sustainability Outlook, 16 
January 2020, <http://sustainabilityoutlook.in/content/india%E2%80%99s-position-a11icle-6-cop25-
explained-7 663 29>. 
64 Asian Development Bank, supra note 49, 13. 
































































Article 6(2) mechanism. 66 The sheer variety of NDCs in tem1s of their scope, coverage 
of gases and sectors, metrics, and timeframes makes any c01Tesponding adjustments 
almost impossible between single-year and multi-year DCs.67 
The oft-lauded flexibility of the Paris Agreement, therefore, has provided rather too 
much flexibility for reaching agreement on ambitious Article 6 rules around carbon 
trading. As with the Marrakesh negotiations, the sheer complexity of these mechanisms, 
and the options available to parties, or demanded by them, makes consensus extremely 
difficult. Many large developing countries and some EITs are pushing for as much 
flexibility as possible under Article 6 in order to reduce the contributions pledged in 
their NDCs. Lax Article 6 rules may be an indirect way of subve1iing the 'name and 
shame' approach of the Paris Agreement. This may stem from some leftover reluctance 
by some developing countries at the move away from the strict, binary differentiation 
which characterized the Kyoto Protocol. It is also possible that countries are resisting 
any discipline being applied to carbon markets through multilaterally agreed rules. 
4.2. Paris Rulebook v. Marrakesh Accords 
The negotiations over the implementation of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, as 
discussed in the previous section, bear a resemblance to those at COP 6 bis and COP 7 
leading to the Marrakesh Accords. 68 For example, there is concern about over-reliance 
on trading to achieve NDC goals, reminiscent of the earlier debates on hot air. One 
might have expected a 'maturation ' of the UN climate regime from the Convention, 
through the Kyoto Protocol, the MatTakesh Accords, the Paris Agreement, and the Paris 
Rulebook.69 However, a compa1ison of the two endpoints suggests a sta1iling 
conclusion: if anything, the debate over the 'markets ' text of the Paris Rulebook 
demonstrates considerable backtracking compared with Marrakesh. 
Thus there is still debate over the very purpose of Article 6 and the extent to which 
trades should facilitate OMGE. Avoiding double-counting is a persistent issue in the 
implementation of Article 6, a question that barely arose during the negotiation of the 
Marrakesh Accords. Creative accounting that might produce such a result was assumed 
by essentially all pai·ties to be precluded by the elementary good-practice standards that 
form the foundation of the Accords. More fundamentally, what meaning does a right to 
emit have against the background of a non-binding NDC, in practice unenforceable 
under either public international or domestic law? And how could such products be 
traded with confidence, given their imprecise definition? The Rulebook negotiations are 
further hobbled by the need to address transitional issues, such as credits carried over 
from the CDM. 
66 Wemaere, supra note 48, para 6.21. 
67 Ibid. , para 6.22 . 
68 Jean-Charles Hourcade and Frederic Ghersi, 'The Economics of a Lost Deal: Kyoto - The Hague -
Ma1rnkesh', 23 (3) Energy Journal 1 (2002) 3 (' the Marrakesh accord, the new benchmark of climate 
policy discussions, leaves unresolved the key structural questions of the climate policy regime ') . 
69 See Julia Kreienkamp, 'The Long Road to Paris: The History of the Global Climate Change Regime ', 
































































In the two decades since MatTakesh, the climate regime has entirely appropriately come 
to encompass many related issues that were not front-and-center in the Kyoto Protocol' s 
implementation, such as public pat·ticipation on the part of intended beneficiaries in 
planning projects, and social issues such as gender equity, the rights of indigenous 
peoples, at1d dispat·ate impacts on communities of color, marginalized groups, and the 
poor. The potential social and ecological consequences of adaptation measures and 
mitigation in the forn1 of afforestation and reforestation are also much better appreciated 
than two decades ago. It is now widely accepted that addressing challenges to climate 
integiity necessarily engages these concerns, but superimposing them on the markets 
undoubtedly adds an additional layer of complexity. 
While facilitating emission reductions through the flexibility mechanisms certainly was 
a concern in drafting the MatTakesh Rules, the negotiators had the benefi t of working 
with the Kyoto Protocol, whose very architecture not only presumed but affirmatively 
facilitated achieving emission reductions through trades in emission rights. The 
mechanisms were conceptualized as ancillary to the Am1ex I patties ' emission-reduction 
obligations, which were understood to be the principal workhorse in the Protocol's 
regulatory design. By contrast, the outcome of the A1iicle 6 implementation talks is 
being characte1ized as 'make or break' for the Paris Agreement, pat·ticularly if robust 
rules are not agreed. From the Protocol ' s point of view, this is clearly a situation of the 
tail wagging the dog. The Paris Agreement is not a trade agreement in the sense of the 
GATT/WTO suite of rules, or even an agreement regulating trade in environmentally 
relevant products, such as the Basel and Rotterdam Conventions or CITES. Rather, it is 
an organic entity devoted first and foremost to commons management, more closely 
analogous to the Montreal Protocol, which-tellingly- allows for strictly limited 
trading and offsets in a manner designed to further its remedial purpose. 
The Kyoto Protocol' s tradable emissions rights-AAUs, ERUs, CERs, and RMUs- are 
all fundamentally commensurable, in the sense of at·ticulating the same metrics. The 
base year for each of the Protocol ' s emission-reduction obligations is 1990 (with a few 
exceptions for EITs). The targets are similat·ly unifom1, and are built into tradable 
emission rights, fully transparent and knowable. The Protocol was designed from its 
inception to accommodate the flexibility mechanisms as an integral component of tl1e 
scheme. The MatTakesh Rules were fundatnentally targeted at ensuring the integrity of 
trades. Hence, the pat·ticulat· attention to sinks-given the difficulties in identifying 
reliable measurement methodologies- and the CDM as inherently involving leakage 
from the closed system of Annex I parties. Certain substantive choices, such as the 
treatment of nucleat· power installations, were hat·d-fought, but peripheral to the basic 
task of assuring the integrity of counting, and accounting for, emissions. 
Retooling the regime towat·d the Paris Agreement's largely voluntary, bottom-up 
architecture undercut many of the Protocol' s attributes that in principle facilitated the 
environmental integrity of trading. Base years are no longer uniform, nor are endpoints. 
Many non-Am1ex I NDCs at·e not even frat11ed in terms that are measurable or 
countable. While some studies have anticipated the impacts and environmental integrity 
of different approaches, 70 it is unclear whether patties will heed these studies in the 































































negotiations on Article 6. By comparison with emission tights under the Protocol, the 
rights being traded under the Agreement are likely incommensurable, in the sense of 
being established against a background of a multiplicity of metrics. 
The history of the Paris Rule book' s negotiations also highlights a wide divergence in 
goals and purposes compared with the Marrakesh Accords. At COP 24 in 20 18, 
virtually all the other components of the Paris Rulebook were agreed to. They include 
texts on transparency, NDC accounting, national invent01ies, reporting, and 
compliance. 71 Article 6 was left hanging, as something of a self-contained, freestanding 
mini-negotiation. The fact that the ITMO portion of the Pa1is Agreement is severable is 
thrown into sharp relief by the fact that it has in fact been severed and placed in a kind 
of multilateral purgatory. Meanwhile, a multiplicity of interests have been circling the 
detached limb, attempting to influence the outcome while the stakes rise ever higher. 
Decoupling such questions as rep01i ing, accounting, and compliance from the rules for 
implementing the mechanisms of Kyoto Protocol ' s Atiicles 6, 12, and 17 would have 
been well-nigh inconceivable; an alteration to any one portion of the highly 
interconnected structure of the Marrakesh Accords would have invited reconsideration 
of interdependent passages elsewhere. The refrain in multilateral agreements, 'Nothing 
is agreed until everything is agreed ', was pa1iicularly apt in Marrakesh. By contrast with 
the Accords ' substantive precision, the Paris Rulebook is painted with a broader brush 
and, paiiicularly with respect to the Article 6(4) mechanism, evinces a greater reliance 
on the institutional processes accompanying the creation of credits. For example, neither 
sinks nor nuclear power installations are identified by name in the current Article 6 
drafts. The negotiators seem to have ' agreed to disagree ', in effect kicking the can down 
the road to the subsequent phase of institutional implementation. 
The 'mai·kets' text of the Pai·is Rulebook has suffered from the Paris Agreement's very 
malleability, with wildly diverse constituencies- states with potentially competing 
national interests, NGOs, private industry, and so forth- projecting their needs onto the 
text. Private, for-profit business interests are literally and figuratively all over the map, 
including the oil-and-gas fim1s, renewable-energy companies, chemicals manufacturers, 
producers of cars, trucks, and buses, and many sub-pemmtations of them, are only the 
most obvious players. Completing the Marrakesh Accords seemed close to an 
overwhelming challenge-the most complicated envirom11ental negotiation to that date. 
Yet, by comparison with the cmTent situation going into the Glasgow COP, the earlier 
drafters had the luxury of a reasonably c1isp mandate and an underlying international 
treaty that had already completed much of the job. 
5. Conclusion 
The Marrakesh Accords cast a long and gloomy shadow over the ongoing Article 6 
negotiations. The sai11e issues and obstacles ai·e present, such as the desire to fo ld hot air 
into calculations, but with an added layer of immense- and perhaps insurn1ountable-
Environmental Integrity of Carbon Markets under Al.tide 6 of the Paris Agreement' , Institute for Applied 
Ecology, 2021 , <https://ercst.org/wp-content/uploads/202 1/01/Oko.jpg>. 
































































analytical complexity as a matter of principle: the flexibility of the Paris Agreement 
which allows, and encourages, a huge diversity of NDCs. This flexibility was originally 
designed to ensure that all parties, developed and developing, shared responsibility and 
commitments for emission reductions. But it largely papered over significant divisions, 
which are alive and well, and actively resmiacing in the Atiicle 6 negotiations. 
Large developing countries are seeking to 'claw back' conceded responsibilities by 
inserting flexibility into the rules around Atiicle 6. Many developed countries are doing 
the same. Waiting in the wings, and advocating for such flexibility, are large private 
entities who want to publicly promise climate ambition while benefiting from cheap, 
flexible offsets traded through unaccountable markets. The similarities in the problems 
facing negotiators of the Man-akesh Accords and Article 6 is disappointing: we should 
have come much fa1iher than we have, considering the dire climatic circumstances we 
now find ourselves in. What helped to resolve the complexity in Man-akesh was the 
solid treaty background against which the rules were negotiated. egotiators now have 
a less ce1iain treaty landscape to navigate. 
The A1iicle 6 negotiations illustrate a fundamental conundrum of the climate regime. 
The Paris Agreement would not have been successfully concluded without providing 
states with flexibility, but this flexibility tends to undem1ine the promise and ambition 
of the global wam1ing limitation goals within it, by leading to lax rules; and it makes it 
easy to lose sight of the remedial goal of the Paris Agreement and the fundamental 
challenge of commons management, namely that all states must accept concrete near-
term burdens in return for visionary and distant benefits. 
The IPCC continues to remind us that time is short. The 'markets ' text of the Paris 
Agreement should prevent skimming from trades that fai l to promote sustainability or, 
worse, undermine that goal. The Article 6 text, cloaked in abstruse language and a 
diplomatic setting that seems incomprehensible to the uninitiated, may indeed end up 
being 'make or break ' in the sense of inviting leakage that could end up undermining 
the Paris Agreement. The oft-maligned world of the Kyoto Protocol and the MatTakesh 
Accords does not seem so bad in hindsight. 
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